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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
sion rule will be afforded by employing the device of intensive cross-examina-
tion of the complaining witness at the trial. It is here that defense counsel
must make his most diligent effort to uncover any falsification of the facts which
may lead to a usurpation of his client's rights.
Paul J. Di Giulio
CORAM NOBIs NOT To BE GRANTED WHERE No SHOWING THAT PERJURED
TESTIMONY WAS USED
Romeo was convicted for first degree murder. One of the witnesses who
testified against him was an accomplice in the murder. The district attorney
promised the accomplice witness, Gramando, that he would do all he could to
have Gramando's wife released from a charge involving the illegal possession
of a revolver, if Gramando would give information leading to the solution of the
unsolved homicide. At the trial Gramando, during cross examination, said that
he had received no promise or consideration for his testimony; and, that his
motive for giving the testimony was the hope that his wife would be released
from the revolver charge. The jury was informed that Gramando's wife was
released before the trial. In summation the prosecutor said that no promises
were made to Gramando. In 1962, sixteen years after the conviction, Romeo
applied for a writ of coram nobis which, though denied in the Court of General
Sessions, was granted by the Appellate Division on the ground that the prose-
cutor did not correct testimony which he knew was falsified. The Court of
Appeals held, reversed per curiam, and found that there was no basis for con-
cluding that Gramando had perjured himself, and that his denial of a promise
did not affect "the jury's appraisal of Gramando's credibility." People V.
Romeo, 12 N.Y.2d 751, 186 N.E.2d 420, 234 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1962).'
In order to preserve basic fairness in our system of justice, whenever the
state prosecutor, a quasi-judicial officer, 2 introduces testimony which he knows
is perjured, the conviction is against due process and the state must supply
a remedy whereby the conviction is vacated and a new trial is had.3 If the
prosecutor fails to correct unsolicited perjured testimony when he discovers it
at a trial, this is also against due process.4 The Supreme Court has held that,
even though the accomplice witness had apprised the jury that he had an interest
in testifying by indicating that the public defender offered him help, the prose-
cutor should have still corrected the false testimony in which the witness denied
a promise of consideration from the prosecutor.5 Judge Fuld, a member of the
1. Upon motion to amend the remittitur and for reargument, the remittitur was
amended with the addition that the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated.
People v. Romeo, 12 N.Y.2d 842, 187 N.E.2d 472, 236 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1962).
2. People v. Fielding, 158 N.Y. 542, 547, 53 N.E. 497, 498 (1899).
3. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
4. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957)
(false answers misrepresented witness' relationship with defendant's deceased wife) ; See also
Annot., 3 L. Ed. 2d 1991 (1959); Annot., 2 L. Ed. 2d 1575 (1958); 11 Vand. L. Rev. 922
(1958).
5. Napue v. Illinois, supra note 4.
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New York Court of Appeals, expressed the underlying reason for the necessity
to correct perjured testimony denying a promise of consideration from the prose-
cutor. He said "that the existence of such a promise might be a strong factor
in the minds of the jurors in assessing the witness' credibility and in evaluating
the worth of his testimony."6
Notwithstanding that the other evidence is sufficient for a conviction, the
conviction obtained when the prosecutor fails to correct perjured testimony will
not stand.7 It is fundamental that the disclosure of the promise be made to the
jury. Disclosure by the prosecutor to a judge about the granting of immunity
to a witness from felony counts did not remedy the defect which was brought
about when, afterwards, the witness 7denied to a jury that there was a promise
of consideration.8 The courts of New York, have said that the prosecutor
should have corrected the testimony in the following instances. A district at-
torney who allowed testimony to go uncorrected because he thought the issue
about one witness meeting another witness was trivial, had his conduct labeled
as a "fraud." 9 Testimony denying a promise from the prosecutor should have
been corrected when the prosecutor had given an inducement "in the nature of
a promise."'1 In regard to evasive and half-true testimony which, in effect, con-
cealed an understanding with the prosecutor, the court said that the defendant
"was entitled to full, unequivocal disclosure to the jury of any understanding
between the witness and the prosecution." '" The witness' testimony about his
own moral character is a factor which the prosecutor must correct since his
moral character is relevant to the issue of credibilty.12 The doctrine concerning
perjured testimony has several limitations. In the event that the perjured
testimony is stricken from the record, on motion of both the defense counsel
and the prosecutor, there is no need for correction of the deleted testimony.1
In order to procure a writ of coram nobis it is necessary that the prosecutor had
knowledge of the perjured nature of the testimony.14 Coram nobis relief will
be denied if there is not shown a sufficient link between the perjured testimony
and the prosecutor's knowledge of the perjury.15
In the per curiam opinion which incorporated the Appellate Division dis-
6. People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 136 N.E.2d 853, 855, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885,
887 (1956); ci. People v. Capuano, 15 A.D.2d 400, 225 N.Y.S.2d 252 (4th Dep't 1962)
(prosecutor's objection to question about receiving benefit from testifying should have
been overruled).
7. See People v. Savvides, supra note 6, at 557, 136 N.E.2d at 854-55, 154 N.Y.S.2d
at 887.
8. People v. Taylor, 2 A.D.2d 977, 157 N.Y.S.2d 102 (2d Dep't 1956).
9. People v. Steele, 65 N.Y.S.2d 214, 221 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1946).
10. People v Mangi, 10 N.Y.2d 86, 88, 176 N.E.2d 86, 87, 217 N.Y.S.2d 72, 73 (1961).
11. People v. Podinker, 27 Misc. 2d 282, 289, 210 N.Y.S.2d 174, 180 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
N.Y. County 1961).
12. People v. Brandau, 19 Misc. 2d 477, 481, 189 N.Y.S.2d 818, 824 (Oneida County Ct.
1959) (dictum).
13. People v. Lester, 10 A.D.2d 971, 202 N.Y.S.2d 385 (2d Dep't 1960).
14. People v. Oddo, 300 N.Y. 649, 90 N.E.2d 896 (1950); Petition of Meisel, 133
N.Y.S.2d 534, 535 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
15. People v. Rodriquez, 13 Misc. 2d 1004, 178 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y.
County 1958).
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sent, 16 the Court of Appeals said that since the jury knew of Gramando's request
to have his wife released from the revolver charge and the actual release of his
wife, there was no basis for concluding that there was falsification of testi-
mony or suppression of fact by the prosecutor. The Court said that when the
witness and prosecutor said no promises, they meant that no promises of
leniency for Gramando, himself, were made to Gramando. The statement about
no promises did not include promises to Gramando about leniency for his wife.
The Court concluded that the statement about no promises did not affect the
"jury's appraisal of Gramando's credibility."
The Appellate Division dissent said that the test for determining whether
or not a new trial should be given, is whether the false testimony "may have
had an effect on the outcome of the trial."'17 An unwillingness to upset a long
standing conviction "upon finely-spun technical considerations of theoretical
fair play" was indicated. It agreed with the majority of the Appellate Division
that some type of promise was made to Gramando but said that "any claimed
discrepancy could not in any reasonable likelihood have prejudicially affected
the defendant." The dissent thought that Gramando was shown at his worst
in regard to his credibility because the jury knew about his request for help
for his wife, his wife's release and his murder indictment. Because promises for
testimony and promises for the giving of information are different, it was rea-
soned that the promise was not for testimony but for information. The basis
of this reasoning was that the prosecutor -had Gramando's wife released before
Gramando gave the testimony. The prosecutor was said to be not so impractical
as to release the wife before the testimony was given unless the promise was for
information. Then, since the promise was merely for information, there was no
falsification of fact. The failure to mention the promise of help for the wife
was said to be merely a breach of "courtroom etiquette." But, still, in regard
to the difference between the two types of promises, the dissent said that the
"trial prosecutor would have been better advised to have qualified his statement
with a more ample disclosure of the distinction."
In Napue v. Illinois the jury was given some ground for believing that the
witness had an interest in testifying.' 8 But he denied the existence of a promise
from the prosecutor. In the instant case the jury was apprised of some facts
which show that the witness had an interest in testifying and the promise
was also denied. The Court in the Napue case said: "The jury's estimate of
truthfullness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of
guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest
in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend."' 9 In this
case the witness may have been deceptive on the witness stand after his wife's
16. People v. Romeo, 16 A.D.2d 240, 226 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1st Dep't 1962).
17. People v. Romeo, supra note 16, at 244, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 961; accord, Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1958).
18. Napue v. Illinois, supra note 17, at 270.
19. Id. at 269.
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release because he may have feared that his wife would be charged with the
revolver violation again, if he didn't give the testimony after he gave the false
information. In regard to the difference between a promise for testimony and a
promise for information, the Appellate Division majority in the instant case
said that they were the same in substance.20 It seems impractical that the prose-
cutor would not use the informant after information is given. In fact, the prose-
cutor received testimony from Gramando at the trial. It seems that the jury
should know about the promise for information so that it can consider whether
the witness was deceptive when he gave the information and continued telling
falsehoods at the trial. Jurors rather than appellate courts should evaluate the
witness' credibility.21 The physical benefit of the promise to the witness may
run to the witness' wife, but this does not mean that the husband will not fabri-
cate for his wife. In this case the witness wanted his wife free for his baby's
sake. He said "my baby means more to me than anybody. ' 2 2 Even though
these considerations exist, it is apparent that the jurors were sufficiently in-
formed of the facts surrounding the promise for the information. But, a case
with a weaker indication of the witness' interest in testifying should warrant
a new trial.
Anthony S. Kowalski
LEGAL INSANITY NOT ESTABLISHED BY SHOWING DEFENDANT OPERATES UNDER
OWN STANDARD OF MORALITY
Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to
death. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the defense urged that defendant was
insane in that he believed his acts to be pursuant to the command of God. De-
fendant's statement to an Assistant District Attorney revealed that while pan-
handling on Broadway, he obtained an invitation from one Rescigno to spend
the night at the latter's apartment; that defendant intended to rob Rescigno;
that following extensive drinking at the apartment, defendant learned that
Rescigno was degenerate; that defendant thereafter killed both Rescigno and
one Sess, Rescigno's roommate, who was asleep in another room; that defendant
hated degenerates and believed himself to be commissioned by God to kill them;
that he was able to deceive psychiatrists into believing that he was insane, and
that he had perpetrated such deception while in prison for a prior conviction in
order -that he could thereby obtain privileges not allowed in prison. At trial, ex-
pert testimony on the issue of legal insanity clashed, although it appeared that
defendant was not able to control his impulses, had a pathological personality,
and had an undeveloped moral judgment. Held, conviction affirmed, three judges
dissenting. Legal insanity is not established where one operates under a standard
20. People v. Romeo, 16 A.D. 2d 240, 242, 226 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (1st Dep't 1962).
21. People v. Mleczko, 298 N.Y. 153, 163, 81 N.E.2d 65, 70 (1948).
22. People v. Romeo, 16 A.D.2d 240, 241, 226 N.Y.S.2d, 957, 998 (1st Dep't 1962).
